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S. 115 AND H. 288: STEPS TOWARD LOGIC AND FAIRNESS IN
THE OHIO PROBATE LAW

I.

INTRODUCTION

S. 115' and H. 2882 make revisions in various sections of the Ohio
probate law. S. 115 contains provisions dealing with a wide range of
topics, including the right to exoneration from mortgage liens on devised real property, 8 the effect of the passage of time on a durable
power of attorney,' and exemptions from the odometer disclosure law
for vehicles transferred by will or inheritance.' H. 288 deals with the
personal liability of fiduciaries, trustees, and administrators who hold a
general partnership interest, or enter into contracts while acting in
their fiduciary capacity.6
This note will explore the problems and considerations which
prompted the legislature to make these revisions in the Ohio probate
law. It will also examine the revisions themselves and discuss the effect
these revisions will have on the practice of probate law in Ohio.
II.

SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION

S. 115, which was introduced upon the recommendation of the
Ohio State Bar Association (O.S.B.A.), makes seven general revisions
in the Ohio probate law. 7 The first revision provides that a person who
inherits property which is burdened by a mortgage lien will acquire the
property subject to the mortgage lien.8 Under Ohio law prior to the
enactment of S. 115, a person who acquired title to real property by
devise was exonerated from the burden of the mortgage; the burden,
therefore, fell upon the remainder of the estate.9
A second revision instituted by S. 115 exempts the transfer of ve1. Act of June 30, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-313 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered
sections of tits. 13, 21, 45 & 53 Omo REv. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1983)).
2. Act of Nov. 30, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-368 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered
sections of tits. 13 & 17 Omo REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1983)).
3. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.54, 2113.52 (Page Supp. 1983).
4. Id. § 1337.09(A).
5. Id. § 4505.06(B)(2).
6. Id. § 1339.65.
7. These revisions were suggested and the original proposals were drafted by the Board of
Governors of the Probate and Trust Law Section of the Ohio State Bar Association. Interview
with Donald Schweller, member of the Probate and Trust Law section of the O.S.B.A. (March
14, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Schweller interview] (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review).
8. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2113.52(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
9. See Report of the Probate & Trust Law Section, 55 Omo ST. B.A. REP. 1809, 1810
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Probate Report 1982].
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hicles by devise from the odometer disclosure requirements of Ohio
law. 10 Prior to the enactment of S. 115,11 an executor or administrator
was required to comply with the odometer disclosure requirements

whenever a motor vehicle was transferred to a beneficiary or heir at
law.

12

The third change made by S. 115 concerns the power of the courts
of common pleas to sell or lease real estate held in trust when the trustee has specifically been given such power by the instrument creating
the trust. Under the provisions of section 5303.21,13 as it existed prior
to the enactment of the revisions, the courts of common pleas had the
power to sell" or lease 5 real estate despite any objections raised by the
trustee. S. 115 revises sections 5303.21 and 5303.31 to provide that the
courts of common pleas no longer have this authority when the trustee
has been given the power of sale or lease by the instrument creating the
trust. Therefore, property cannot be sold or leased unless the trustee
consents.
The fourth revision made by S. 115 provides a creditor with an
option when filing a claim against the estate. The creditor may simply
file the claim with the executor or administrator of the estate, or the
creditor may file the claim with the estate and submit a copy of the
claim to the probate court.' Under the law prior to the adoption of S.
115, the creditor was required to file his claim with the executor or
administrator of the estate;"1 the executor or administrator was then
required to compile a list of all the claims submitted and file it with the
probate court.1 8 The new bill provides that if the creditor has chosen to
file a copy of the claim with the probate court, the probate court shall
not close the administration of the estate until the claim has either
been allowed or rejected.1 9
The fifth alteration made by the bill allows a testator to confer
upon another person the power to nominate the testator's personal representative. Ohio Revised Code section 2107.6520 provides that a testa-

10. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4505.06(B)(2) (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983).
11. S. 115 was passed June 3, 1983, and was signed into law by Governor Celeste on July
14, 1983. Act of June 30, 1983, Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-313 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered sections
of tits. 13, 21, 45 & 53 Omo REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1983)).
12. This requirement was imposed by Omo REV. CODE AN. § 4505.06 (Page 1982).
13. Id. § 5303.21 (Page 1981 & Supp. 1983).
14. Id. (Page 1981).
15. Id. § 5303.31.
16. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.06(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
17. See Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 211.06 (Page 1982).
18. Id.
19. OiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.06(F) (Page Supp. 1983).
20. Id. § 2107.65.
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tor may confer "the power to nominate

. . .

an executor, co-executor,

co-executor." ' 1

successor executor or successor
This section also allows
the testator to specify that a person so nominated may serve without
bond. s2
The sixth change instituted by S. 115 involves the duration of a

durable power of attorney. 8 Under prior law it was not clear whether
the authority of a durable power of attorney was affected by the passage of time. As a result, some financial institutions refused to honor a
durable power of attorney which had not been recently executed.2 4 S.
115 clarifies the law by amending section 1337.09(A) to specifically
provide that the authority of a durable power of attorney is not affected
by the lapse of time after its execution unless the instrument itself
states a termination date."
Finally, S. 115 amends the probate law by enacting section
1337.09(B).2 6 This section authorizes the principal of a durable power
of attorney to nominate either the attorney in fact,'7 or another qualified person" to be appointed the guardian of the principal's person,
estate, or both if the need for such a guardian should arise. Prior to the
enactment of S. 115, Ohio law did not permit a principal to nominate a
guardian.
H. 288, which was introduced at the request of the Ohio Bankers
Association, 9 concerns the personal liability of an executor, trustee, or
administrator who undertakes a general partnership interest or enters
into a contract in a fiduciary capacity.' 0 Under the prior Ohio law, the
party holding the general partnership interest was held personally lia-

21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. A "durable power of attorney" is one in which the principal provides, by the use of
particular language, that the authority of the attorney in fact is not affected by the subsequent
disability of the principal. See OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N BILL ANALYSIS: AM. S.B. 115
(As REPORTED BY THE H. CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM.) 4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S.
115 LEGIsLATIvE ANALYSIS] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
24. See Report of the Probateand Trust Law Section, (pt. II) 56 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 592,
594 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Probate Report 1983].
25. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
26. Id. § 1337.09(B).
27.

An "attorney in fact" is one who is given the power of attorney, in a writing, to act as a

party's agent or attorney. The power of attorney is revoked by operation of law upon the death of
the principal. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1055 (5th ed. 1979).
28. A person is qualified to be appointed guardian when he or she is competent, suitable,
and willing to accept the appointment. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.121(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
29. Schweller interview, supra note 7.
30. See OIo LEGISLATURE SERV. COMM'N, BILL ANALYSIS: H.B. 288 (As INTRODUCED) 1
(1983) [hereinafter cited as H. 288 LEGISLA71VE ANALYSIS] (on file with University of Dayton
Law Review).
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ble for the debts and obligations incurred by the partnership." This
was true whether the general partnership interest was held pursuant to
one's fiduciary duties or solely for one's own self-interest. Obviously,
this situation was inherently unfair, and it discouraged banking institutions, corporate fiduciaries, and individuals from holding a general
partnership interest while acting in a fiduciary capacity. 5 Thus, under
the prior law, a person acting in a fiduciary capacity received very littles in return for having his or her personal assets placed at risk. H.
288 provides immunity from personal liability to an executor, administrator, or trustee who holds a general partnership interest or enters into
a contract while serving as a fiduciary.3 4

III.

ANALYSIS

The impetus and original drafting of S. 115 was supplied by the
O.S.B.A. 3s As originally introduced,s S. 115 made four revisions in the
37
Ohio laws dealing with the administration of decedents' estates.
A.

Sections 2107.54 and 2113.52: The Right to Exoneration

The first revision, which is embodied in amended section 2113.52
of the Revised Code, denies a devisee the right to exoneration from
mortgages which burden devised real estate unless a right to exoneration is specifically granted by the testator." Under the law prior to the
enactment of S. 115, unless there was a specific provision in the will to
the contrary, a devisee of real estate which was encumbered by a mortgage lien was provided a right of exoneration from the mortgage lien.3s
Thus, the party who acquired title to real estate through devise was
allowed to reap the benefits which accrued to such title, but incurred no
obligation for the mortgage lien. Consequently, the burden of the mortgage lien fell upon the residuary estate. The previous section 2107.54
31. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.14 (Page 1982).
32. Testimony of William E. Karnatz, vice-president and manager of the Personal Trust
Division of the Central National Bank of Cleveland, before the House Civil & Commercial Law
Comm. (April 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Karnatz testimony] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
33. When a party acts in a fiduciary capacity, the profits from the partnership go to the
beneficiary of the trust or estate, not to the fiduciary. The fiduciary receives a ministerial fee only.
Karnatz testimony, supra note 32.
34. OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.65 (Page Supp. 1983).
35. Testimony of Sen. Zimmers on Am. S.B. 115 before the House Civil & Commercial
Law Comm. (June 14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Zimmers testimony] (on file with University of
Dayton Law Review).
36. The bill was originally introduced by Senator Zimmers on March 9, 1983. S. 115 LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 23, at 6.
37. Zimmers testimony, supra note 35.
38. OsHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.52(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
39. See Probate Report 1982, supra note 9, at 1809, 1810.
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provided that when an estate sold devised property to pay a debt owed
by the testator, the other devisees and legatees had to contribute proportionately so that the loss was shared equally by all non-exonerated
devisees and legatees. 40 Thus, under prior law, the burden of a mortgage lien was actually borne by the remaining devisees and legatees,

while the devisee who received the real estate was completely
exonerated.
The O.S.B.A., through its Probate and Trust Law Section, 41 concluded that this result was caused by a misinterpretation of the law and
was contrary to the intention of the average testator.42 The revisions to
sections 2107.54 and 2113.52 were proposed to clarify the law and to
allow the courts to honor the intention of the testator. The revisions
accomplish this by shifting the burden of the mortgage lien from the
residuary estate to the specific devisee who acquired title to the real
estate.43
The revisions made in sections 2107.54 and 2113.52 are predicated
upon common sense and fairness. The revisions have no adverse effects
on the rights of creditors and allow the burden of a mortgage lien to
follow the property for which it was incurred. Furthermore, a testator
may still grant a right of exoneration to a devisee by including specific
language to that effect in the will. Thus, these revisions, which allow a
testator to exonerate a devisee from the burden of a mortgage lien but
do not create a presumption of exoneration, bring the law into accord
with commonsense notions of justice. Therefore, the revisions should
have a positive effect on the way the law is perceived by the citizens of
Ohio.

OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.54 (Page 1976). The section stated in part:
When real or personal property, devised or bequeathed, is taken from the devisee or
legatee for the payment of a debt of the testator, the other devisees and legatees must
contribute their respective proportions of the loss to the person from whom such payment
was taken so that the loss will fall equally on all the devisees and legatees according to the
value of the property received by each of them.
40.

Id.
41. The O.S.B.A. is sub-divided into various committees, each of which deals with a specific
area of law. The Probate and Trust Law Committee is one such committee, and it is responsible
for determining if legislation is needed in the area of probate and trust law. If the committee
determines that legislation is needed, a proposal and sample draft is written by the committee
members. The proposed legislation is published in the Ohio Bar Journal, and sent to the O.S.B.A.
Council of Delegates. If it is approved by the Council of Delegates, it is sent to the O.S.B.A.'s
lobbyists, and they attempt to get the proposed draft introduced by a legislator. See Schweller
interview, supra note 7.
42. See, Probate Report 1982, supra note 9, at 1809, 1810.
43. Zimmers testimony, supra note 35.
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Section 4505.06: Odometer Disclosure

The revisions made in the odometer disclosure law are very practical and logical. The language of section 4505.0644 makes it clear that
the provision is intended to protect purchasers of used motor vehicles.
Thus, on its face, the section is not relevant when a motor vehicle is
acquired by devise or inheritance. When a person acquires a motor vehicle by devise or inheritance, no purpose is served by requiring the
beneficiary or legal heir to certify the vehicle's mileage to himself or to
herself. Furthermore, there is no reason to require a fiduciary to comply with the disclosure requirements,4 5 because, as in the case of a beneficiary, there are no consumer interests which require protection.
Therefore, since the impetus for the disclosure requirement is not present in these cases, the creation of an exception to the odometer disclosure requirements is very logical. The revisions remove a potential
source of irritation to individual fiduciaries and beneficiaries. More importantly, they remove a legal requirement which could be perceived as
serving no purpose other than to harass the citizens of Ohio.
C.

Sections 5303.21 and 5303.31: The Power to Sell and Lease

The amendments to sections 5303.21 and 5303.31 of the Revised
Code insure that the express wishes of the grantor of a trust will be
followed. The O.S.B.A. recognized that the law which authorized
courts of common pleas to sell or lease an estate held in trust, without
the approval of the trustee who had been given the power to sell or
lease the real property, 4' was basically unfair and ignored the grantor's
intention. 7 The revisions simply deprive the courts of common pleas of
this authority; when the trust instrument gives the trustee authority to
sell or lease real property, the estate cannot be sold or leased without
the trustee's consent." Thus, the change insures that the wishes of the
grantor, as expressed in the creating instrument, will not be frustrated
by the courts.

44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4505.06(B) (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983). See supra note 10.
45. Id.
46. See OHno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5303.21, 5303.31 (Page 1981).
47. See Report of the Probate and Trust Law Section, 54 Ohio St. B.A. Rep. 699 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Probate Report 1981].
48. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5303.21, 5303.31 (Page Supp. 1983). Section 5303.21(B)
states that "[§If an estate is held in trust and if the trustee is authorized by the trust instrument to
sell real property, a court of common pleas shall not authorize the sale of the estate pursuant to
division (A) of this section unless the trustee consents to the sale." Id. § 5303.21(B). Section
5303.31(B) states that "[i]f an estate is held in trust and if the trustee is authorized by the trust
instrument to lease real property, a court of common pleas shall not direct pursuant to division
(A) of this section that the estate be leased unless the trustee consents to the lease." Id. §
5303.31(B).
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D.

Section 2117.06: Options in Filing a Claim

The amendment to section 2117.06 provides a creditor with the
option of filing a copy of the claim with the probate court in addition to
the requirement that the claim be filed with the executor or administrator of the estate.4 9 This change is intended to protect the creditors' interests. For example, a creditor could be in a situation where he or she
does not wish to institute litigation to enforce the claim, yet does not
want the claim to be ignored." Under prior law, the administrator of
the estate was required to compile a list of the known claims and submit it to the probate court.51 Thus, it was possible for an estate to be
closed by a probate judge when, through inadvertence or by the active
design of the administrator, the judge was not aware of one or more
claims. The revision offers a creditor a method by which this possibility
can be eliminated. If a creditor files the claim with the probate court as
well as with the estate, the probate court cannot close the administration of the estate until the claim has either been allowed or rejected. 2
Therefore, the revision provides a method, short of instituting a legal
action, by which a creditor can insure that a claim will be considered.
The executor still has the authority to allow or reject the claim, subject
to the approval of the probate court," but the creditor no longer is
faced with the possibility that a claim will be completely ignored.
E.

Additional Revisions Instituted by S. 115

During its consideration of S. 115, the House Civil and Commercial Law Committee included further revisions of the Ohio probate law
in the bill. These revisions were recommended and originally drafted by
the Probate and Trust Law Section of the O.S.B.A.
1.

Section 2107.65: The Nomination of Executors
Section 2107.65 was enacted to deal with the nomination of execu-

49.
50.
51.

Id. § 2117.06(B).
See Probate Report 1982, supra note 9, at 1809.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.16 (Page 1976).
Id. § 2117.06(F) (Page Supp. 1983). Section 2117.06(F) specifically states that "[ilf a
presents a claim against an estate in accordance with division (A)(2) of this section, the
court shall not close the administration of the estate until that claim is allowed or reId.
See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.17(B) (Page Supp. 1983). This section states in

52.
creditor
probate
jected."
53.
part:
The notice required by this section shall state that a hearing concerning the debts has been
scheduled, shall set forth the time and the place of the hearing and shall state that the
action of the executor or administrator in allowing and classifying claims will be confirmed
at such hearing unless cause to the contrary is shown.
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tors. The section permits a testator to confer by will the power to nominate a personal representative." It also confers upon the testator the
power to declare in the will that the person nominated may serve without bond. 55 The necessity for this provision can be illustrated by the
situation in which the testator has provided by will that a specific person or group of persons has the power to nominate the executor of the
testator's will.56 Because section 2113.055 7 did not specifically provide
that a person so nominated could serve without bond, some probate
courts took the position that if the name of the nominated executor was
not specifically indicated in the will, the person nominated was required
to post bond. Section 2107.65 clearly resolves this issue. 9
2.

Section 1337.09: The Duration of Durable Powers of Attorney

When the O.S.B.A. learned that "certain financial institutions in
the State of Ohio were failing to honor Durable Powers of Attorney
which were not recently executed,"' 0 it recommended a revision of the
law dealing with the duration of a durable power of attorney. 1 The
O.S.B.A. concluded that this inaccurate interpretation of the law was
caused by a lack of clarity in section 1337.09,2' and felt that the addition of a simple provision would eliminate the problem.63 The resulting
amendment of section 1337.09(A) makes it clear that in the absence of
a specific terination date, the authorityof an attorney in fact is not affected by the passage of time following the execution of a durable
power of attorney.6
This revision is significant because it insures that the wishes of the

54. Id. § 2107.65. The section states:
A testator may confer in his will, upon one or more persons, the power to nominate, in

writing, an executor, coexecutor, successor executor, or successor coexecutor, and may also
provide in his will that persons so nominated may serve without bond. If a will confers such
a power, the holders of it have the authority to nominate themselves as executor, coexecutor, successor executor, or successor coexecutor unless the will provides to the contrary.
Id.
Id.
See Probate Report 1983, supra note 24, at 592.
OHIo RaV. CODE ANN. § 2113.05 (Page 1976).
See Probate Report 1983, supra note 24, at 592.
See supra note 54.
Probate Report 1983, supra note 24, at 592, 594.
Id.
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.09(A) (Page 1979).
Probate Report 1983, supra note 24, at 592, 594.
64. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.09(A) (Page Supp. 1983). The pertinent part of this
section states that "the authority of the attorney in fact is exercisible by him as provided in the
written instrument notwithstanding the later disability, incapacity, or adjudged incompetency of
the principal and, unless it states a time of termination, notwithstanding the lapse of time since
the execution of the instrument." Id.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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grantor of a durable power of attorney will be given legal recognition.
It is highly unlikely that a person grants a durable power of attorney
with the expectation that, under the law, the authority granted will be
diminished or totally dissipated by the passage of time. Thus, the bill
reconciles the law with the expectations of the average citizen. Viewed
from this perspective, the change is a positive development.
3. Sections 1337.09(B) and 2111.121: The Authority to Nominate a
Guardian
The O.S.B.A. believed that a principal should have the authority
to nominate a person to serve as his or her guardian in the event that it
becomes necessary to institute guardianship proceedings at a future
date."' Consistent with this belief, the O.S.B.A. was instrumental in
revising the law to authorize the principal of a durable power of attorney to nominate a guardian." Accordingly, under the new law, the
court will consider the person nominated for appointment as guardian
of the principal if such an appointment becomes necessary at a future
time. 7 Section 1337.09(B) provides that the principal may authorize
the person nominated, or the attorney in fact, to nominate a "successor" guardian for the court's consideration." The principal is also
granted the authority to direct that bond be waived for any party nominated to serve as guardian under this section."0
Section 2111.121(A) allows the nomination of a guardian to be
made in a writing other than a durable power of attorney.70 The authority granted to a principal by section 2111.121(A) is identical to
that granted by section 1337.09(B). 7' For a nomination under section
2111.121(A) to be effective, the writing must comply with the four re78
quirements described in that section.

65. Probate Report 1983, supra note 24, at 592, 595.
66. Id.
67. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09(B) (Page Supp. 1983). This nomination is not binding on the court, but is for the court's consideration if guardianship proceedings are initiated. See
infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
68. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.09(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 2111.121(A).
71. Id. The principal has the authority to nominate a person to serve as guardian of his or
her person, estate, or both; and, to authorize the person nominated to nominate a successor guardian; and, to direct that bond be waived for a person nominated for appointment as guardian or
successor guardian in accordance with the written instrument. Id.
72. The four requirements for an effective nomination are that the writing shall:
(1) be signed by the person making the nomination in the presence of two witnesses;
(2) be signed by both witnesses;
(3) contain, immediately preceding their signitures, an attestation by the witnesses that the

person making the nomination signed the writing in their presence; and,
(4) be acknowledged by the person making the nomination before a notary public.
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If the principal makes a nomination through either type of writing
and guardianship proceedings are commenced, the court will appoint
the person nominated if that person is competent, suitable, and willing
7
Thus, depending upon the court's interpreto accept the appointmenta.
tation of the terms competent and suitable, this section could constitute
a significant change in the law. Prior to the enactment of S. 115, a
person possessed no legal authority to nominate the party who would,
should circumstances necessitate it, be appointed his or her guardian.
Such authority is significant in light of the probability that most people
have a clear preference concerning who they want to be put in charge
of their financial affairs. Accordingly, sections 2111.121(A) and
1337.09(B) grant the public this authority. Of course, should the principal's choice prove to be unsuitable, the court has the authority to
disregard the nomination7 4 and appoint a more appropriate person to
serve as guardian. 7 ' Thus, the revisions provide individuals with an opportunity to exert greater control over their futures without sacrificing
those futures to the perils of poor judgment by others and unforeseen
circumstances.
F.

H. 288: The Personal Liability of Fiduciaries

H. 288 was originally proposed and drafted by the Ohio Bankers
Association. The bill is designed to alleviate the problems confronting
parties who enter into contracts or acquire general partnership interests
while acting in a fiduciary capacity. H. 28871 provides executors, administrators, and trustees with immunity from personal liability for
partnership debts, obligations, and liabilities which are incurred while
they are holding a general partnership interest in the course of their
fiduciary duties.7 7 The bill also extends immunity from personal liability to fiduciaries and trustees in regard to any contracts they-execute in
the scope of their fiduciary duties.7 8
Under the Ohio partnership law as it existed prior to the enactment of H. 288, an act within the scope of any general partner's auId.

73.

Id. § 2111.121(B).

74. Id.
75. The decision of the court to disregard the nominee and appoint another person guardian
is dependent upon the court's interpretation of the terms "competent" and "suitable." At this
time, there are no reported decisions which clarify this definitional issue. In practice, however, the
probate court's decision on this issue would be subject to an abuse of discretion standard on-appellate review and would therefore be very difficult to successfully challenge. See In re Estate of
Henne, 66 Ohio St. 2d 232, 421 N.E.2d 506 (1981) (examining a court's "suitability" decision
concerning an executor appointment).
76. See OHIo REV. CODa ANN. § 1339.65 (Page Supp. 1983).
77. Id. § 1339.65(B)(2).
78. Id. § 1339.65(A)(2).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/11
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thority was sufficient to bind all the general partners."9 Similarly, the
partnership was held liable for acts of a general partner, even if the
acts were not within the ordinary scope of the partner's authority, provided the acts were authorized by the other general partners.8 0 Thus, a
partnership was held liable for any losses or injuries inflicted upon a
nonpartner by the tortious acts or omissions of a general partner.81 A
partnership was also held liable for a loss incurred by a nonpartner
when the nonpartner's property or money was misapplied by a general
partner while the property or money was in the partnership's custody
and control.82 The language of section 1775.14 created problems for
trustees and fiduciaries. This section provided that all general partners
would be held personally liable, both jointly and severally, for any
debts and obligations incurred by the partnership," including the debts
and obligations described in sections 1775.12" and 1775.13.85
Section 1775.14 created a difficult problem for trustees,
fiduciaries, and administrators, because, prior to the enactment of H.
288, it imposed personal liability upon these parties, who were held to
be the holders of legal title to the trust or property.86 Thus, a party who
acquired a general partnership interest in the course of a fiduciary role
subjected his or her personal assets to liability for any debts or obligations incurred by the partnership.
The testimony of Mr. William E. Karnatz, vice-president and
manager of the personal trust division of the Central National Bank of
Cleveland, illustrated the problems caused by the Ohio partnership law
as it existed prior to the enactment of H. 288. Mr. Karnatz noted that
during the course of his career with the bank, the bank had
experienced numerous situations where it would have been in the best
interest of our trust customers to either (a) continue to participate as a
general partner in the investment and tax opportunities afforded by a
general partnership, or (b) participate as an original investor in one. In

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.08 (Page 1978).
See generally Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1775.01-.15 (Page 1978).

Id. § 1775.12.
Id. § 1775.13.
Id. § 1775.14. The section stated that all partners were liable:
(A) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under sections
1775.12 and 1775.13 of the Revised Code.
(B) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership, but any partner may
enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract.
Id.
84. Id. § 1775.12
85. Id. § 1775.14.
86. Testimony of
Comm. (April 26, 1983)
ton Law Review).

(Page 1978).
See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
Rep. Mahnic on H. 288 before the House Civil & Commercial Law
[hereinafter cited as Mahnic testimony] (on file with University of Day-
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these instances, the high degree of investment prudence to which a
fiduciary is held . . . clearly justified participation in the general partof personal liability to which the Bank's own
nership but for the element
7
assets would be exposed.8

Mr. Karnatz went on to describe the dilemma that faced banks in
Ohio. He stated that while many excellent investment opportunities existed for trust customers willing to acquire a general partnership inter-

est, most of these opportunities were routinely rejected because, as
corporate fiduciaries, banks could not enter into investments which
placed the assets of the bank and its shareholders at risk."8 Thus, banks
were faced with a difficult choice. A bank could either fulfill its role as
fiduciary of a particular trust by entering into the most favorable investment opportunities for the trust, or it could fulfill its role as
corporate fiduciary and refuse to take any action which would place its
assets, and those of its shareholders, in jeopardy. Faced with this
choice, most corporate fiduciaries chose to protect their assets and
those of their shareholders, even though this choice often meant foregoing the most favorable investment opportunities available to an individual trust.
The same dilemma confronted individual executors, trustees, and
administrators.8 9 For example, how many individuals would be willing
to accept a fiduciary role which places their personal assets at risk, but
which allows the benefits to accrue to another person or group of people? Clearly, this position would not be attractive to many people.
H. 288 attempts to solve these problems by providing an immunity, subject to certain exceptions,9" from personal liability for partnership debts and obligations to executors, administrators, and trustees
who acquire a general partnership interest while acting in their fiduciary capacity. The same immunity is granted to trustees of a revocable
trust 1 who become general partners in the course of their fiduciary
capacity. 9" The immunity is only available if the executor, trustee, or
administrator reveals that the general partnership interest is being held

87.
88.

Karnatz testimony, supra note 32 (emphasis in original).
Id.

89.
90.

Id.
These exceptions provide that the immunity is not available if:

(1) the executor, administrator or trustee caused the loss or injury to a nonpartner by tortious
conduct; or
(2) the executor, administrator or trustee personally hold, or a spouse or any lineal descendent holds an interest in the partnership.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1339.65(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1983).
91. The revocable trust must be one which, by its terms, becomes revocable upon the settior's death. Id. § 1339.65(B)(1)(b).
92. Id. § 1339.65(B)(l)(b)(2).
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in a fiduciary capacity. 93 Thus, if an executor, trustee, or administrator
has made a proper disclosure,' he or she would possess all of the rights
of a general partner, but would not be held personally liable for the
partnership's debts and obligations.
Under the provisions of H. 288, the grantor of a revocable trust
would be held personally liable for the debts and obligations of the
partnership when the trustee holds a general partnership interest in a
fiduciary capacity.' 5 Similarly, if an executor, administrator, or trustee
acquires a general partnership interest while acting in a fiduciary capacity, the estate or corpus of the trust will be held liable for the debts
and obligations of the partnership."
H. 288 also provides immunity from personal liability to
fiduciaries' 7 and trustees" for contracts entered into on behalf of the

93. Id.
94. A proper disclosure under section 1339.65(B)(l)(b)(2) requires that the fiduciary do
one of the following:
(a) In a "fictitious" partnership certificate (as described previously) or in any other partnership certificate filed pursuant to statute (such as a limited partnership certificate), the use of
words following the fiduciary's name or signature, indicating the general partnership interest is
held in his or her fiduciary capacity would constitute a sufficient disclosure.
(b) If a partnership certificate is not required to be filed under any statute, a specified certificate filed with one or more county recorders would constitute a sufficient disclosure. The certificate would have to state the full name and place of residence of each person holding an interest in
the partnership, be signed by all such persons, be acknowledged, and use words (following the
fiduciary's name or signature) indicating that the fiduciary holds the general partnership interest
in his or her fiduciary capacity.
(c) A contract or other written instrument that is delivered to a party that contracts with a
partnership in which an executor, administrator, or trustee holds a general partnership interest in
a fiduciary capacity, and indicates that the interest is so held, would constitute a disclosure for
transactions between the party and the partnership. A disclosure by means of a certificate creates
an immunity and would cover such transactions regardless of whether a contract or other instrument indicates that the executor, administrator, or trustee holds the general partnership interest in
his or her fiduciary capacity.
See H. 288 LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 4.
95. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.65(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1983).
96. Id.
97. For the purposes of section 1339.65:
'Fiduciary' means any person, association, or corporation, other than an assignee or
trustee for an insolvent debtor or a guardian under Chapter 5905. of the Revised Code,
that is appointed by and accountable to the probate court, and that is acting in a fiduciary
capacity for another or charged with duties in relation to any property, interest, trust, or
estate for another's benefit. A fiduciary also includes the department of mental retardation
and developmental disabilities, or an agency under contract with the department for the
provision of protective service under sections 5123.55 to 5123.59 of the Revised Code, when
appointed by and accountable to the probate court as a guardian or trustee for a mentally
retarded or developmentally disabled person.
Id. § 1339.65(A)(1)(a).
98. For the purposes of section 1339.65 "trustee" refers to a trustee of an inter vivos trust.
Id. § 1339.65(A)(l)(b). "An inter vivos trust is one created during one's lifetime and hence it
must be in existence at the time of the settlor's demise." Hageman v. Cleveland Trust Co., 41
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estate or trust by the fiduciary or trustee. To be eligible for this immunity: (1) the contract must be within the person's authority; (2) the
person must disclose that the contract is being entered into in the person's capacity as a trustee or fiduciary; 99 and (3) the contract must not
specify that the person is personally liable for the contract. 00
The revisions made by H. 288 are logical and practical. As illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Karnatz,10 ' the law existing prior to the
enactment of H. 288 placed those who acted in a fiduciary capacity in
a pressing dilemma. 02 This bill removes the source of the dilemma,
and requires the party who stands to benefit from the contract or general partnership interest to bear the risk involved with the venture. Because it moves the law in the direction of logic and fairness, this bill
should be looked upon as a step forward for the Ohio legal system.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The enactment of S. 115 and H. 288 did not signal the beginning

of radical or earthshaking changes in Ohio. These bills were not highly
controversial and did not provoke heated debate in the legislature. Nevertheless, the passage of these two bills is significant because the revisions they make in Ohio law move the law in a direction which is both
logical and inherently fair.
The movement toward logic and fairness brought about by these

bills can be illustrated by each of the instituted revisions. For example,
prior to the enactment of H. 288, a person serving in a fiduciary capac-

ity was penalized through the imposition of personal liability for making decisions and taking actions which were in the best interest of the
trust or estate on whose behalf the fiduciary was acting. The law created a situation in which the party gaining the most from the fiduci-

ary's actions was completely immune from liability, while the fiduciary's assets were placed in jeopardy. Clearly this situation was contrary

to ordinary standards of justice and fairness. The revisions made in this
area by H. 288 change the law so that the risk of the activity falls upon
the party who stands to reap the benefits of the activity. Thus, the

changes make the law more understandable and logical to the average
person.

Ohio App. 2d 160, 161-62, 324 N.E.2d 594, 596 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 45 Ohio St. 2d
178, 343 N.E.2d 121 (1976).
99. In a contract, the disclosure requirement is satisfied if the words "trustee," "fiduciary,"
"as fiduciary" or other words which indicate a trustee or fiduciary capacity follow the name of
signature of the trustee or fiduciary. Id, § 1339.65(A)(2).

100. Id.
101.

See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
text.

102. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying
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The changes instituted by S. 115 also move the law in a positive
direction. For example, there was no logical reason to require a party
who acquired a vehicle by devise or inheritance to certify the mileage
on the odometer to himself or to herself as was required by the prior
law. Similarly, because of the intensely personal nature and the long
range impact of a guardianship relationship, there was no valid reason
to impose a guardian upon an individual rather than to allow the person to nominate a guardian. Clearly, the changes made in these two
sections, and the other changes made by S. 115 move the law to a more
logical and fair position than existed previously.
The revisions instituted by S. 115 and H. 288 are significant not
for the specific changes made, but rather for the quality of the reasoning behind the revisions. The changes simplify the law and move it to a
position which should be perceived as being both logical and fair by the
majority of Ohio's citizens. Moreover, the revisions are significant in
that they indicate the Ohio legislature's willingness to employ commonsense solutions to rectify legislative infirmities.
Richard W. Zawtocki
S. 115
Code Sections Affected: To amend sections 1337.09, 2107.181,
2107.54, 2107.59, 2109.02, 2109.21, 2111.02, 2113.05, 2113.12,
2113.52, 2117.06, 2117.17, 4505.06, 4549.41, 4549.46, 5303.21, and
5303.31, and to enact sections 2107.65 and 2111.121 and repeal section
2117.16.
Effective Date: October 14, 1983.

Sponsor: Zimmers (S)
Committees: Judiciary (S)
Civil & Commercial Law (H)
H. 288
Code Sections Affected: To amend sections 1775.03, 1775.14, 1775.15,
1775.17, 1775.33, and 1781.09, and to enact section 1339.65.
Effective Date: March 22, 1984.
Sponsor: Mahnic (H)
Committees: Financial Institutions & Insurance (S)
Civil & Commercial Law (H)
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